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Abstract 
Ubiquitous access to the Internet is becoming critical. Direct cellular network connectivity of mobile devices is not always 
possible or desirable, for various reasons. We design and discuss a scheme that can be used to distribute authorized content to 
devices through Wi-Fi Direct and discuss how to provide incentives to the devices connected to the Internet to securely relay 
traffic, taking into consideration their available energy and bandwidth. 
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1. Introduction 
With the ever increasing demand for Internet access, cellular and Wi-Fi operators struggle to provide ubiquitous, 
uninterrupted service. In addition, in many constrained environments, such as in the Internet-of-Things (IoT), device 
constraints (energy, power, computational power, etc.) make direct, universal, cellular access to the Internet 
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(typically through mobile operators) unappealing. Device-to-Device communication (D2D) is a promising 
technology that can be used when the provider’s network is unavailable or not reachable. 
D2D technologies allow network traffic to flow between end-user devices without requiring any infrastructure, 
such as base stations or access points, potentially reducing the burden on constraint devices and the traffic on the 
cellular network. At the same time this architecture might be providing more efficient usage of the spectrum1. 
D2D is being explored in multiple contexts, including content distribution or sharing applications, Machine-to-
Machine (M2M) communications and the IoT, as well as multiplayer gaming. Our paper proposes a system where 
end-user devices connected to a cellular network (in the remainder of the paper they will be referred to as 
“connected devices”) can share their (licensed) spectrum via Wi-Fi Direct®2 with other devices that cannot directly 
receive service from a cellular operator (referred to as “disconnected devices” from now on). To this end, we design 
a scheme where disconnected devices announce their requirements and through an auction mechanism (which we 
specify that allows connected device to bid for providing service) and a pricing model that takes into account 
bandwidth requirements and energy consumption, they receive relay service from connected devices (and in an 
optimal way). 
The treatment in this work is somewhat high-level and using traditional TCP/IP networking, but it has been 
motivated from and with initial development in the context of the I-CAN project8 considering Information-Centric 
Networking11 for access networks. Proxy Re-Encryption techniques have also been explored in order to only 
forward content usable by authorized devices, thus, even though communication is D2D in Peer-toPeer (P2P) 
fashion, authorization is controlled by the network, service, or application provider. 
2. Background 
Tehrani et al.4 provide multiple scenarios of D2D communication in both licensed and unlicensed spectrum and 
discuss how pricing can be used in order to satisfy both the users and the provider. They compute the revenue of all 
participants in each model and provide ideas for implementation. Their goal is to provide sample pricing models so 
that D2D can be more profitable than conventional cellular networking in these cases. Our model is more specific in 
situations where a device has no cellular connection and the provider is not participating in the pricing. 
Song et al.3 propose an auction model for resource allocation mechanisms in D2D communication in order to 
provide interference avoidance in cellular networks. Each resource block or combination of them has an initial price, 
which changes in every round of the auction. They do not provide any pricing model, but they notice the importance 
of incentives for D2D devices. The auction is for resource blocks and the winner uses them for D2D 
communication. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1: Use case of P2P Group 
Wi-Fi Direct® is a D2D protocol, specified by the Wi-Fi Alliance2 and is built upon the IEEE 802.11 
infrastructure mode. Wi-Fi Direct is a technology that interconnects devices and/or their services in an efficient way, 
without the need for infrastructure. Devices in Wi-Fi Direct mode are called P2P devices. Multiple P2P devices can 
establish P2P Groups. A P2P device holds the role of the Access Point (AP) that connects all members of the group 
and is called the Group Owner (GO). During a discovery phase, devices negotiate their roles, resulting in the 
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creation of a group. All group members are able to communicate with each other by exchanging messages relayed 
by the GO. Interference management is controlled by relevant IEEE 802.11 techniques. Opportunistic Power Save 
(OpPS) and Notice of Absence (NoA) algorithms are part of the protocol for energy efficiency. Fig. 1 shows the 
components of a P2P Group and how they connect to each other. In the example of this figure the P2P Group is 
composed of four different devices. The Television plays the role of the GO. Therefore, data from any device to any 
device is always relayed through the Television. 
3. Proposed System Model  
Our system model considers a Wi-Fi Direct group in which some of the group members are connected to a 
cellular network.  Wi-Fi Direct has coverage of about2 200 m, so it is possible to have connected and disconnected 
devices in the same group because of variation in cellular coverage. However, cellular coverage is not the only, or 
even the main, reason for a device to not have cellular access. It could be simply because of lack of an appropriate 
interface—e.g. many cheaper tablets have only Wi-Fi interfaces—or lack of authorization, e.g., because of 
exhausted budget, or no support for roaming into another providers’ territory. The members of the connected group 
may relay traffic towards or on behalf of the disconnected ones.  Relaying devices consume their energy (battery) 
and cellular quotas (cellular units or even Wi-Fi units) in order to relay traffic, therefore an incentive mechanism is 
needed in order to convince them to share their resources. The idea behind our mechanism is that a relaying device 
can “sell” the spectrum it shares (i.e. makes available to others) and the energy it consumes in the process.  
The proposed mechanism is based on auction theory and uses reverse first sealed-bid auctions. The candidate 
relay devices are the bidders and a disconnected device is the auctioneer (even though this can be delegated to a 
trusted, not connected or not participating in the auction GO). Relays bid prices that are higher than their cost, in 
order to have some profit and less than the “valuation” of the disconnected device, i.e., the maximum price that it is 
willing to pay. The winner of the auction becomes the relay device and sells its relay service.  
Our mechanism is implemented as follows. The disconnected device sends a “relay request” to the GO, as well 
as, the maximum price for a unit of data that it is willing to pay (valuation—encrypted). The GO broadcasts to the 
P2P Group the request. The candidate relay devices compute a selling price for a fixed “relay slot”, i.e., a small 
period of time during which they can relay data using a certain throughput, and send it to the GO. The GO after 
collecting all bids, selects the device which offered the minimum price and associates it with the disconnected 
device. If one or more devices bid the same price, the winner is chosen randomly. The relay device dedicates the 
relay slot exclusively to the disconnected device and charges it for the units of data it relayed. If the disconnected 
device wants to transmit more data when the relay slot expires, it initiates a new auction. 
 Fig. 2 illustrates an example of our mechanism. Device D is disconnected and wants to transmit 100KB. It sends 
to the GO a relay request and the maximum valuation it that is willing to pay (step 1). Devices A and C can offer 
relaying services. GO broadcasts the relay request of D to the P2P Group (step 2). The GO collects all the bids and 
the winner of the auction is the bidder that offered the lowest (feasible) bid (step 3). Finally, the winner of the 
auction is associated with D. In this process the GO is assumed trusted (non-colluding, etc.) 
4. Pricing model 
Every relaying device consumes some of its resources during the relay process. Our model considers battery and 
throughput as parameters, using LTE data7. Relaying devices are assumed to transmit and receive data on behalf of 
the disconnected device for a relaying slot, using a constant, predefined rate. The cost C of relaying data during a 
slot is associated with the power consumption of the relay device, as well as, the price per unit of data it pays to its 
LTE provider. 
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Fig. 2: Steps of our proposed model 
A relaying device uses both the cellular and the Wi-Fi Direct interfaces during the relay process. The energy 
consumption of these interfaces is proportional to the transmission rate. Let tu-LTE and td-LTE be the throughput of the 
uplink and the downlink LTE interfaces, respectively, au-LTE the energy required to transmit 1Mb and ad-LTE the 
energy required to receive 1Mb. The power consumption Pu-LTE and Pd-LTE of the uplink and downlink interfaces, 
respectively, is calculated as follows7: 
Pu-LTE =  au-LTE tu-LTE (1) 
Pd-LTE = ad-LTE td-LTE (2) 
Similarly, the energy consumption for Wi-Fi Direct is described by the following formulas: 
Pu-WIFI =  au-WIFI tu-WIFI (3) 
Pd-WIFI  = ad-WIFI td-WIFI (4) 
Typical values7 for Į for LTE are Įu-LTE = 438,39 mW/Mbps, Įd-LTE = 51.97 mW/Mbps, and for the Wi-Fi Direct 
Įu-WIFI = 283,17 mW/Mbps, Įd-WIFI = 137,01 mW/Mbps. The energy cost of relaying traffic is the sum of the power 
consumption of both interfaces.  
The price, P, at which the relaying device is willing to sell a relay slot should be at least higher than its cost and it 
is calculated using the following formula, 
P = y C + x / e (5) 
where e is the remaining energy (of its battery), as percentage of the battery capacity, C is the cost per data unit 
of the relay device, and x, y are user defined weights. 
Every possible relay device wants to maximize its revenue, while every disconnected device, tries to find a relay 
with the minimum price. So, the disconnected device wants to pay the minimum price that does not exceed its 
valuation. This problem can be formulated as a (linear) maximization problem for every node that wants to be the 
relay and tries to maximize the price P. The problem has the following constraints: the selling price should be less 
than the valuation V of the disconnected device and higher than the relaying cost. 
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Therefore, our maximization problem is the following: 
Maximize P = y C + x / e 
 subject to: 
P  C,  P  V. 
The revenue R for each relay device that has relayed data in total during d slots is computed using the following 
formula (where d is amount of data): 
R = (P – C) d. 
The total cost C’ for every disconnected device for transmitting and receiving the same number of slots is 
calculated as: 
C’ = P d. 
5. Security mechanisms 
The data that a disconnected device sends and receives may be sensitive. An appropriate mechanism is needed in 
order to provide confidentiality and integrity of the data. Data flows through the relay and the GO whose role is to 
interconnect the peers of the Wi-Fi Direct Group. The only entities that should be able to access this data are the 
service provider and the disconnected device. A trivial mechanism for protecting these data can be constructed 
based on public key and symmetric key cryptography. With this mechanism, a disconnected device chooses a 
symmetric key, encrypts this key using the provider’s public key and forwards it to the provider: all subsequent 
messages will be encrypted using this key. 
A drawback of the proposed trivial mechanisms is that encrypted data cannot be re-used: there can be cases 
where some data already relayed by a relaying node are of interest to another disconnected node (e.g., a popular 
video). In these cases the relaying node can decrease its costs (hence, it can offer a better price to a disconnected 
device) with the use of caching. A technology that provides data confidentiality, without negating caching, is proxy 
re-encryption. A Proxy Re-Encryption (PRE) scheme9 is a scheme in which a third semi-trusted party, called the 
proxy, is allowed to alter a ciphertext, encrypted with the public key of a user A (the delegator), in a way that 
another user B (the delegatee) can decrypt with her own appropriate key (i.e., in most cases her secret private key). 
The re-encryption process takes place using a re-encryption key generated by the delegator and leaks no information 
to the proxy. In our system we use the Green & Ateniese9 Identity-based proxy re-encryption scheme (IB-PRE). 
An Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) scheme is a public key encryption scheme in which an arbitrary string can 
be used as a public key. An IBE scheme is specified by four algorithms: Setup, Extract, Encrypt and Decrypt. 
x Setup: it is executed by a Private Key Generator (PKG). It takes as input a security parameter k and returns 
a master-secret key, MSK, and system parameters, SP. The MSK is kept secret by the PKG, whereas SP 
are made publicly available. 
x Extract: it is executed by a PKG. It takes as input SP, MSK, and an identity ID, and returns a secret key 
SKID.  
x Encrypt: takes as input an identity ID, a message M, and SP, and returns a ciphertext CID. 
x Decrypt: takes as input CID, the corresponding private decryption key. SKID, and returns M. 
The IB-PRE scheme specifies two new algorithms, RKGen and Reencrypt, in addition to the IBE algorithms 
already discussed. 
x RKGen: it is executed by the owner of a public key ID1. It takes as input SP, his secret key, SKID1, and an 
identity, ID2, and generates a re-encryption key: RKID1ĺ ID2. 
x Reencrypt: it is executed by the proxy. It takes as input SP, a re-encryption key, RKID1ĺ ID2, and a 
ciphertext, CID1, and outputs a new ciphertext, CID2. 
The trivial mechanism can now be modified as follows. Each disconnected device owns an identity. The first 
time a relaying node requests a content item on behalf of a disconnected device A, the provider generates a 
symmetric encryption key, k, encrypts the item using k and encrypts k using the identity of A. Now a relaying node 
may cache the encrypted item, as well as, the encrypted symmetric encryption key (i.e., k). When another device B, 
requests the same content item, the relaying node may simply request from the provider (or even the device A) a re-
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encryption key that can be used for re-encrypting the encryption of k. Then is can forward the encrypted, cached, 
content item, along with the re-encryption of k. 
Another, reliability and trust-related, issue of our architecture is a “proof of work” for the relaying device. The 
disconnected device, instead of paying directly, each time, it can create and digitally sign a “receipt” for the services 
it received from the relaying node. This receipt will prove that the service was indeed contributed by a specific 
relay. A receipt should be unforgeable and bound to the identity of the relay. Moreover, the receipt generation 
process should prevent replay attacks. We propose a mechanism where a receipt is generated with specific 
parameters that are able to prove the “real” contribution and consumption process. Our receipt generation protocol 
creates receipts that contain: (1) the public key of the relay device, (2) a timestamp that denotes the beginning of the 
relay process, (3) the amount of downloaded/uploaded data. The receipt is digitally signed by the disconnected 
device. 
6. Evaluation 
We evaluate the proposed scheme through simulations. In our initial simulations we do not consider caching. We 
simulate a topology where relay candidates, initially, have equal available battery levels (90%). Moreover, we 
assume that each device has 100 free Mb from its LTE provider and after that it pays 1 monetary unit per Mb. We 
assume that a relay slot has duration of 1 minute and during this slot each relay device offers 1Mbps of bandwidth. 
All relays lose 1% for transmitting data at this rate during one relay slot. Every 1 minute one disconnected device 
initiates an auction in order to relay 600 Mb of data. The valuation of each device is 2.5 monetary units. Moreover, 
it is assumed that at the end of a relay slot each disconnected device follows the following strategy: if the 
renegotiated price is less than the valuation, it continues using the same relay device. 
There are in total 5 disconnected devices. The price for relaying 1 Mb is calculated by each candidate relay using 
Eq. (5). The values for x and y are set to 5 and 1.5 and are constant. As mentioned previously, when multiple devices 
sell the service at the same price, the winner is chosen randomly.  Fig. 3 shows the selling price for each candidate 
relay node. As it can be seen, initially, all candidate devices bid with the same price. At this round “Device 1” is 
selected. At time 2 “Device 1” has consumed all its free Mb; that is why it places a high bid. At this time “Device 2” 
is selected. At time 3, “Device 1” offers an even higher bid and this is because it has consumed some of its battery. 
Eventually, all devices become relays. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3: The selling price for each candidate relay node 
Moreover, we implemented the Green & Ateniese proxy re-encryption scheme (based on IBE) using the Charm 
Crypto library10.  Cryptographic operations in IBE require some public (and assumingly well-known) system 
parameters. In order to achieve a security level equivalent to RSA with key size 1024 bits, the size of the public 
system parameters is set to 2048 bits. With these system parameters the size of a 128 bit encrypted symmetric key is 
3232 bits and the size of a re-encryption key is 1536 bits. 
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7. Conclusion 
We proposed a scheme where Wi-Fi Direct can be used to provide relay service to devices that are disconnected 
from cellular providers. The idea is that the Wi-Fi Direct group has candidate relay devices that want to “sell” their 
spectrum (and energy) in order to serve the disconnected devices. In our work we proposed and evaluated a pricing 
model based on energy consumption and bandwidth parameters. We used a reverse first sealed-bid auction in order 
to find which candidate will take the role of the relay. In the evaluation, we showed that our model provides fairness 
and does not favor specific devices.  
Considering business issues, one could consider that the price paid to a relay device could be a discount on the 
relay’s cellular monthly bill. Similarly, if the disconnected device has a cellular contract, the price paid could be 
charged to its monthly bill. If not, other means, e.g., e-payments or bitcoins, could be considered. 
Planned future work and improvements include the following: The user defined weights in our pricing mode, x 
and y, should be selected in an optimal way, especially if low battery is a critical condition. Also, Wi-Fi Direct is a 
technology that may provide multiple tetherings, so we will examine the case where multiple relay devices can serve 
a disconnected device at the same time. 
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